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LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE 
HOLMES. By Albert W. Alschuler. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 2000. Pp. x, 326. Cloth, $30; paper, $18. 
"More, more, I'm still not satisfied!"1 
Holmes has kept scholars busy for most of a century, and the re­
sulting volume of literature about him is staggering. In the last twenty 
years alone, we have been blessed with four biographies, 2 four sympo­
sia,3 three new collections of his works,4 two volumes of essays,5 and 
various monographs,6 not to mention a multitude of free-standing law 
* Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Dr. iur. utr. 1982, Uni­
versity of Freiburg; LL.M. 1983, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
1. I thought this quote came from William Shakespeare's Macbeth, but closer scrutiny 
revealed that it doesn't. The only source I can cite to is therefore, TOM LEHRER, SMUT 
(1965) (no pun intended). 
2. GARY J. AICHELE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR.: SOLDIER, SCHOLAR, JUDGE 
(1989); LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES (1991); SHELDON NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1989); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF (1993). To be sure, no complete biography of Holmes 
existed before 1989. Two of Holmes's official biographers, Felix Frankfurter and Grant Gil­
more, never published the fruits of their research (if any); the third completed at least two 
volumes, see MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING 
YEARS 1841-1870 (1957); MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: 
THE PROVING YEARS 1870-1882 (1963). On Holmes and his biographers, see pp. 31-33. AI­
schuler suspects that the failure of the official biography projects was in part due to the frus­
tration of the potential authors about Holmes's essentially bleak character. Id. 
3. Robert W. Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as Legal and Social Science, 10 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 719 (1982); Symposium, The Path of the Law after One Hundred Years, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 989 (1997); Symposium, The Path of the Law JOO Years Later: Holmes's Influence on 
Modern Jurisprudence, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1997); Symposium, The Path of the Law To­
day, 78 B.U. L. REV. 691 (1998). 
4. 1-3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: COMPLETE PUBLIC WRITINGS 
AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (Sheldon M. Novick 
ed., 1995); THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, 
JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Richard 
A. Posner ed., 1992); THE FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES: THE MAKING OF AN 
AMERICAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Frederic R. Kellogg ed., 1984). 
5. THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992); 
"THE PATH OF THE LAW" AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000). 
6. MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, JUSTICE HOLMES AND NATURAL LAW (1992); H.L. 
POHLMANN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
1676 
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review articles.7 Since life is short, everyone who adds to the deluge, 
including Albert Alschuler8 with his new book, bears a heavy respon­
sibility to make the expenditure of trees, library space, and reading 
time worthwhile. Does Law Without Values fulfill that responsibility? 
Despite the book's considerable weaknesses the answer is yes, but it is 
a close call. 
The book presents such a multitude of theses, theories, and ideas 
about Holmes, his work, and jurisprudence more generally, it is easy 
for the reader to get lost. As best I can see, it basically pursues three 
agendas. First, Law Without Values attacks Holmes as a person, judge, 
and scholar. While much of Alschuler's critique, depicting the man as 
a harsh nihilist and his work as deeply flawed, hits home, most of these 
attacks are not new but reiterate existing scholarship. Second, 
Alschuler seeks to explain Holmes by looking at him as an existential­
ist and positivist. The author's claim that this brings to light the consis­
tency between Holmes's character, philosophy, and work is interest­
ing, but the attempt to explain away the contradictions and tensions 
within Holmes is as time-honored as it is questionable. Third, the book 
blames Holmes for having corrupted modern American jurisprudence. 
The thesis that Holmes's bleak positivism made a crucial contribution 
to the demise of values in modern legal thought is intriguing, but 
Alschuler fails to substantiate it. 
Alschuler does not clearly define or distinguish between these 
three agendas, and he constantly shifts back and forth among them, 
often, one suspects, unconsciously. While the execution of all three 
agendas leaves something to be desired, the book as a whole conveys 
an important message. It illuminates the troublesome implications of a 
jurisprudence so skeptical of moral values that it reduces law to its in­
strumental function - a jurisprudence shared by Holmes and major 
currents of our own age. 
At the outset, a note of disclosure is in order. On several occasions, 
Alschuler counts me among the Holmes enthusiasts whose (positive) 
views he then proceeds to attack.9 I have always considered myself 
more critical of, than enthusiastic about, Holmes,10 but I have no ax to 
grind and no position to defend. Moreover, I agree with most of 
(1984); DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES - HIS THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY 
(1995). 
7. For a selection of most recent works, see pp. 201-02 n.61. 
8. Wilson-Dickinson Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 
9. See pp. 10, 200 n.61 (listing my review essay , Why Holmes? 88 MICH. L. REV. 1908 
(1990) among the "laudatory " writings on Holmes); pp. 14-15 (counting my characterization 
of Holmes as the cultural idol of American law among the "hosannas," p. 16); p. 15 (reading 
my characterization of Holmes as having "praised Holmes at length "). 
10. While I thus feel somewhat misunderstood as a Holmes fan, I am not claiming that 
this is Alschuler's fault rather than my own. On the whole, Alschuler's use of other scholarly 
work, including mine, strikes me as balanced and appropriate. 
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Alschuler's perceptions of the man and the work, and even with many 
of his views on the current state of American legal scholarship, my cri­
tique of Law Without Values notwithstanding. 
I. ATTACKING HOLMES 
Perhaps the most pervasive theme of Law Without Values is a no­
holds-barred attack on Holmes. The book is not a biography but 
mostly a long essay in pursuit of Holmes's dark side. In a nutshell, the 
critique proceeds as follows. 
Holmes, the perceived "hero of American law" (p. 14), subscribed 
to a bleak "power-focused philosophy" (pp. 14-30). He was unable to 
embrace any substantive values or causes (chillingly, the only cause he 
ever believed in as an adult was eugenics). He was neither a utilitarian 
nor a true pragmatist but rather an existentialist. Sharing important 
characteristics with his contemporary Nietzsche (p. 19), he embraced a 
"noble nihilism" (p. 20) and revered "struggle, violence, death, and 
the unknown" (p. 29). Personally, Holmes was self-absorbed and indif­
ferent to others, ambitious and egotistical (pp. 31-40). He had many 
acquaintances, especially among the famous, but few, if any, real 
friends. "He lacked (and resisted) familiar forms of love and support" 
(p. 40) - witness his professed relief about having remained childless 
(pp. 35-36) - and as a human being he was cold, harsh, and lonely. 
Both his power-focused philosophy and his personal character traits 
largely resulted from his civil war experience (pp. 41-51). Whatever 
pre-war beliefs he had held (e.g., in abolitionism) completely collapsed 
in the horrors of Balls Bluff, Antietam, and Chancellorsville. Amidst 
senseless death and destruction, Holmes lost the ability to believe in 
any causes and values - with the exception of the soldier's faith in 
blindly throwing away his life. From then on he sneered at human val­
ues and considered war the height of human experience. 
Holmes's judicial opinions evince his harsh personality and power­
focused philosophy (pp. 53-83). His work on the Supreme Court dem­
onstrates his inclination to validate the outcomes of power struggles. 
His deference to legislative decisions was not an expression of a so­
cially progressive attitude but of letting the elected majority have its 
way; consequently, he upheld progressive and repressive legislation 
alike (p. 63). Thus, Holmes was not at all a great liberal and defender 
of individual rights for their own sake. Only late in life, probably un­
der the influence of Brandeis, did he veer somewhat in that direction 
(pp. 82-83). 
Holmes scholarship does not justify his reputation as America's 
greatest legal thinker. His book, The Common Law, has mostly been 
overrated (pp. 84-131). Its truly remarkable (and well-known) part is 
very small - it consists of "five great paragraphs" (p. 85) and these 
paragraphs were not nearly as pathbreaking as their reputation sug-
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gests (pp. 86-103). The ideas expressed here had long since been de­
veloped by others and were widely shared at the time - many of them 
even by Holmes's jurisprudential target, Christopher Columbus 
Langdell. In fact, the opposition between the formalist Langdell and 
anti-formalist Holmes is largely an invention of later generations. The 
huge, "mercifully unread" (p. 131) remainder of The Common Law -
i.e., Holmes's lengthy search for fundamental principles of liability -
was by and large a scholarly disaster (pp. 104-25). The attempt to dis­
till all-encompassing principles from the multitude of cases was a 
thoroughly formalist enterprise and worse than anything Langdell 
ever attempted. Holmes's arguments and analyses were confused and 
contradictory and most of his results implausible, if not patently ab­
surd. All in all, the book was a "clear failure."11 Holmes's most famous 
essay, The Path of the Law,12 does not fare much better (pp. 133-180). 
While the piece has frequently been praised as one of the best essays 
ever written about law, closer inspection reveals fundamental flaws. 
This is true for all four elements of the "Holmesian positivism" the ar­
ticle expresses (p. 133) - i.e., Holmes's prediction theory, his "bad 
man" test, his attempt to separate law and morals in general, and his 
idiosyncratic theory of contract in particular.13 The whole piece is full 
of ill-considered and implausible statements, and Alschuler finds vir­
tually nothing to be said in its favor. 
Alschuler's explanation of why such a brutalized man holding such 
flawed views became the hero of modern American law is threefold 
(pp. 181-86). First, Holmes actually had several impressive qualities 
(such as brilliance, powerful prose, prestigious pedigree, striking ap­
pearance, charm, and longevity), and his views on the crucial constitu­
tional issues of the time ultimately carried the day (p. 181 ). Second, 
the promotion of Holmes by Felix Frankfurter, Harold Laski, and 
11. P. 125 (citing Saul Touster, Holmes a Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law and 
Legal Theory, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 673, 685 (1982)). Holmes's decisions on the Massachu­
setts Supreme Judicial Court also show that his thinking about the common law was 
"mechanistic, " "undistinguished, " and "at least as callous and pedestrian as those of most 
other jurists of his time. " Pp. 130-31. 
12. 0.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
13. Holmes's prediction theory "neither corresponds to the ordinary meaning of the 
word [Jaw] in our language nor to the meaning of law in our lives. " P. 139. Its focus merely 
on courts and merely on sanctions is much too narrow, pp. 145-46, and leaves Jaw devoid of 
any substantive content. Pp. 170-71. His "bad man " test misses the mark because a bad man 
would worry much Jess about what the courts do than about what those executing their 
judgments (i.e., sheriffs) do. P. 145. More importantly, the test is woefully incomplete be­
cause people obey legal rules not only for fear of sanctions but also because of their con­
science and a "sense of reciprocity. " P. 149. Holmes's crusade against the use of moral ter­
minology in law is ultimately pointless because a complete separation of the Is and the 
Ought is impossible. "In one sense . . .  Jaw plainly is separate from morals, and in another 
sense, it plainly is not. Moral sentiments shape Jaw, but law can be immoral. " P. 151. Finally, 
his theory of contract as simply an obligation to pay damages for nonperformance is "a 
hopeless jumble of ill-considered prescriptive and descriptive ideas. " P. 176. 
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other influential disciples created a powerful myth about him to which 
he contributed by telling "tales, true and false" (p. 184) about himself. 
Third, Holmes formulated and promoted the ideas that came to de­
termine the character of twentieth century American jurisprudence.14 
What is the reader to make of this diatribe against the most re­
vered figure in American law? Alschuler's attack on Holmes is terribly 
one-sided, but I do not consider that a flaw. I take it to be Alschuler's 
very purpose to present the case against Holmes in order to provide an 
antidote to all the lavish praise Holmes has received from others.15 In 
current American legal scholarship, deconstruction is a widely re­
spected agenda, and "[w]hen you strike at a king, you must kill him."16 
Moreover, Alschuler recognizes that Holmes had attractive sides and 
emphasizes that the "book does not deny his greatness" (p. 181). 
Alschuler just does not make Holmes's positive sides his concern. 
The real problem with his attack is that too little of it is new. Any­
one who is conversant with the literature about Holmes - and 
Alschuler does not seem to write for the uninitiated - will find most 
of his points quite familiar. Holmes's nihilist and Darwinian outlook; 
his cold and harsh personality; his war experience underlying both 
phenomena; the error of reading his Supreme Court opinions as ex­
pressions of liberalism; the limited originality of his ideas expressed in 
The Common Law; the formalism, confusion, and ultimate failure of 
the book; the pedestrian character of his common law decisions; the 
fundamental problems with his positivist claims advanced in The Path 
of the Law; the creation of the Holmes-myth by his fans and disciples; 
and many other aspects, facts, and stories have already been explored 
by others and even by Alschuler himself.17 There is no need to support 
this statement here, because Alschuler provides all the evidence. He 
duly quotes and cites those who have made the respective observa-
14. Pp. 184-86. See infra Part III. 
15. On the very first page, the author declares that his book "presents a critical review 
of the life and work of Justice Holmes. " P. 1. On several occasions, Alschuler begins his ar­
gument by citing those praising Holmes and then proceeds from there. See, e.g., pp. 14-15, 
132. My understanding that he purported to write an indictment may be too generous, be­
cause in other instances he sounds as if he wanted to engage in a more balanced analysis. 
See, e.g., p. 10 ("[T]his book reviews the evidence . . . .  "). 
16. This was the advice Holmes received from Ralph Waldo Emerson when he showed 
him an essay criticizing Plato. The story is well-known and recounted by Alschuler as well. 
P. 41. 
17. Perhaps the most original part of the book, i.e. the critique of the positivism Holmes 
expressed in The Path of the Law, had previously been published as a law review article. See 
Albert Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes' Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later, 
49 FLA. L. REV. 353 (1997). 
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tions and arguments on hundreds of occasions.18 Alschuler is not pla­
giarizing, but he is repeating. 
Alschuler was apparently conscious of this problem, because he of­
fers something of a justification. He considers the more recent litera­
ture on Holmes overwhelmingly laudatory and the older, more critical, 
views largely forgotten (p. 10), implying that the older views need to 
be revisited in order to avoid too rosy a picture of Holmes. Yet, the 
recent Holmes scholarship is not overwhelmingly positive (in fact, 
most of the older views were).19 Much of it is quite critical 20 or, like the 
modern biographies, at least fairly balanced.21Alschuler belies his own 
characterization of the modern scholarship because he cites much of it 
throughout the book in support of his own highly negative views. 
To be sure, Alschuler's critique is not just a mindless collection of 
old hats. Some of its elements are new: some of the well-known views 
are worked out in greater detail than before, supported by better evi­
dence, and expressed more persuasively, and Alschuler assembles the 
multitude of prior criticisms in one book. But novelty is the exception; 
elaboration does not always lead to new insight, and I wonder whether 
the whole of the book's critique really amounts to more than the sum 
of its parts.22 
Alschuler's bleak personal portrait of Holmes is also quite unsym­
pathetic. At least today, we might consider Holmes a victim of war, 
haunted by nightmarish images and scarred by extensive emotional 
damage. To be sure, it is difficult to feel sorry for someone who had a 
brilliant career, succeeded in fulfilling his highest ambitions, and on 
the whole appeared to be content rather than tragically unhappy. But 
perhaps a lonely and childless man with few, if any, real friends de­
serves more pity than condemnation. 
Alschuler's attack on Holmes is mainly a collection and elabora­
tion of arguments that have been made against Hol�es over the years 
with occasional new insights sprinkled throughout. Judged by the 
18. See also the collection of critical writings about Holmes by David Dolinko, 
Alschuler's "Path," 49 FLA. L. REV. 421, 422 (1997). For a summary of the older literature, 
see G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (1971). 
19. This is particularly true in the early to mid 1930s. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Mr. 
Justice Holmes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1279 (1935); Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes, 43 
HARV. L. REV. 857 (1930); Frederick Pollock, Mr. Justice Holmes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1277 
(1935). 
20. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 48-50 (1977); Gordon, 
supra note 3; David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 
DUKE L.J. 449 (1994); David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Es­
say on Holmes's The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (1997); Touster, supra note 
11; Louise Weinberg, Holmes' Failure, 96 MICH. L. REV. 691 (1997). As mentioned, I also do 
not consider my own writing about Holmes "laudatory." See, e.g., Mathias Reimann, Why 
Holmes?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1908, 1922-24 (1990). 
21. See supra note 2. 
22. See infra Part IV. 
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standards of modern American legal scholarship, which prizes novelty 
above almost anything else, 23 this cannot count as a great accomplish­
ment. And given the existing mass of Holmes scholarship, one may 
doubt whether the book's critique, in and of itself, sufficiently ad­
vances our understanding of the man and his work to justify the effort. 
Yet, while this critique takes up most of the book's pages, it is only 
one of its agendas. 
II. EXPLAINING HOLMES 
While much of Alschuler's attack simply purports to demonstrate 
that Holmes's greatness was a lot smaller than is commonly believed, 
the book also seeks to prove a larger thesis. Looking at Holmes as a 
nihilist, Darwinist, and positivist shows that the contradictions and 
tensions that many scholars have found in Holmes are more apparent 
than real. According to Alschuler, such a perspective reveals that "the 
extent to which Holmes's worldview, politics, legal work, and person­
ality all matched one another is remarkable. There is a unity to his 
epistemology . . . jurisprudence . . .  and personal ethics" (p. 11) be­
cause a "glorification of war, power, and struggle became the center­
piece of Holmes's approach to just about everything" (p. 49). 
The thesis is intriguing, and its development in such detail is new. 
On the whole, Alschuler's effort to support it is quite successful. Yet, I 
wonder whether the endeavor as such makes much sense. 
Alschuler's effort succeeds not because he proves his case beyond 
a reasonable doubt, but because he makes it plausible enough to merit 
careful consideration. Of course, both his overall thesis and most of his 
evidence are debatable. The overall thesis that Holmes's harshness, 
nihilism, and positivism determined virtually all his adult life and legal 
work is open to dispute simply because during his long career, Holmes 
did, said, and wrote many things that seem contradictory (and because 
personally, he never seems to have been intentionally nasty to any­
one). It is no wonder, therefore, that other scholars have proffered 
very different explanations of Holmes and have emphasized other fea­
tures of his thought.24 Individual pieces of proof are subject to doubt 
because much of what Holmes said and wrote was enigmatic and in­
vites different readings.25 Thus one can quarrel with many of 
Alschuler's interpretations (although most of the responses would re­
quire a full-fledged law review article), and some scholars have done 
23. Personally, I find this infatuation with novelty at the expense of other values, such as 
the integration, orderly presentation, or updating of existing knowledge misguided and silly, 
but that is besides the point here. 
24. See, e.g., HOFFHEIMER, supra note 6; POHLMAN, supra note 6. 
25. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
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so with considerable success.26 One can also think of evidence openly 
conflicting with Alschuler's thesis but such instances are rare.27 Yet, 
ultimately all one can ask of any interpretation of Holmes is that it be 
debatable in the positive sense of deserving serious attention. 
Alschuler's thesis passes this test with flying colors. 
Still, I wonder whether any search for the single key that unlocks 
all the mystery in Holmes makes any deeper sense. I doubt it, but not 
because such a search is necessarily doomed to failure - it may or 
may not be.28 Instead, such an endeavor strikes me as questionable be­
cause consistency is not what Holmes himself was all about nor what 
makes our engagement with him rewarding. Holmes himself did not 
deeply care for consistency, at least most of the time, as Alschuler 
demonstrates so vividly with regard to so much of Holmes's scholar­
ship.29 He liked to play Mephistopheles,30 i.e., to provoke, dazzle, and 
puzzle. He fought the human desire to reconcile all contradictions be­
cause he believed that "repose is not the destiny of man,"31 although 
he himself often yielded to this temptation. Perhaps even more impor­
tantly, the scholarly discussion of Holmes and his work over the past 
century has been fueled largely by the perceived contradictions and 
tensions in his ideas. He stood at so many crossroads that he wove to­
gether a multitude of diverse strands - historicism and modem law­
making, formalism and instrumentalism, scholarship and judging, nar­
rowminded reasoning and grand ideas, liberalism and totalitarianism, 
to name just the obvious. This coexistence of conflicting ideas - not 
26. See the responses to an earlier version of one central chapter, Albert Alschuler, The 
Descending Trail: Holmes' Path of the Law One Hundred Years Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353 
(1997), by David Dolinko, Alschuler's "Path, " 49 FLA. L. REV. 421 (1997), and James 
Gordley, When Paths Diverge: A Response to Albert Alschuler on Oliver Wendell Holmes, 49 
FLA. L. REV. 441 (1997). 
27. It may be possible to find consistency even between Holmes's First Amendment 
majority opinions and his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 
(1919), a year later, because all of them are ultimately based on deference to the results of 
power struggles: the former in the legislature, the latter on the marketplace of ideas. Pp. 71-
81. But I cannot read Holmes's almost contemporaneous dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918), as the product of a harsh nihilist who believed in and cared about 
nothing. It is true that Holmes wanted to defer to the outcome of the legislative process here 
as well but he also chastised child labor as an "evil " which all civilized countries have con­
demned and he viewed legislative prohibitions as a measure to prevent "ruined lives. " Id. at 
280. 
28. Of course, every interpretation of Holmes will be somewhat imperfect. On a few 
occasions, Alschuler admits as much, most importantly with regard to Holmes's judicial 
opinions. See pp. 11, 52-53. 
29. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
30. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
291, 295 (1920). 
31. Holmes, supra note 12, at 466. 
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any kind of real or imagined consistency - is what makes his juris­
prudence so intriguing that we cannot let go of him.32 
Alschuler is right that it is too simple to divide the phenomenon of 
Holmes into "Jekyll Holmes and Hyde Holmes" (p. 15), but it is also 
too simple to see, this multifaceted jurist only as an internally coherent 
thinker, as "just Holmes" (p. 20). Instead, Holmes's ideas turn out to 
be both - contradictory on one level and coherent on another, com­
plex in some contexts and simple in others, crystal clear on a few occa­
sions and maddeningly vague in most other instances. It all depends 
on who looks at these ideas, when, where, and for what purpose. In 
this regard, Holmes's thinking was like the law itself. This is why 
Holmes is justly considered the law's most prominent symbol in the 
United States, and why explaining away his contradictions and ten­
sions strikes me as strangely besides the point. Yes, there is the harsh, 
nihilist, and positivist Holmes Alschuler portrays, and it is quite plau­
sible to see this side of him as internally consistent. But there is also 
his tension-ridden alter ego, and on the whole, the contradictory 
Holmes is the more interesting, as well as the more significant. 
III. BLAMING HOLMES 
Alschuler focuses on the coherent - i.e., consistently nihilist and 
positivist - Holmes because he casts him as the principal "villain," 
(p. x), in the book's larger morality play. On its stage, Holmes appears 
as the leading forerunner of the very skepticism and nihilism Al­
schuler deplores in twentieth century jurisprudence. The plot is diffi­
cult to follow because the book presents the play in bits and pieces at 
its beginning and end (pp. 1-10, 184-186, 187-190) and without regard 
to chronological order. The story is roughly this: 
The first act describes the early period. Since the time of Socrates 
and Cicero and through the age of the great natural law thinkers, 
Western culture was committed to substantive ethical values as the 
foundation of jurisprudence. In the common law realm, this natural 
law tradition was evident in the works of Locke, Blackstone, Jefferson, 
Marshall, Kent, Story, etc. (p. 9), and it lasted until the time of the 
Civil War. In the second act, beginning in circa 1870, Darwin entered 
the stage and, in his wake, positivism and moral skepticism came to 
the fore. A revolution occurred during which Holmes, as well as 
Langdell, Beale, Pound, and many lesser lights, took over American 
jurisprudence. They pushed natural law out of the picture and re­
placed it with positivism and value skepticism. They were so success­
ful, that, subsequently, "moral relativism [had] its longest sustained 
32. Even if Alschuler is right that Holmes's "Nietzschean-Darwinian" worldview can 
hold all the parts of The Path of the Law together, p. 135, that hardly means that we will stop 
struggling with the essay. 
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run in Western history" (p. 19). In the final act, we see how this new 
thinking dominates modern American law. Value skepticism appears 
in two versions: mild and piquant. The milder version (pp. 2-6) is a 
"murky utilitarian pragmatism" (p. 2) that prevails in legal education, 
scholarship, and judging. Embracing no substantive ethical principles 
of right and wrong, it is consequentialist and instrumentalist, though 
ultimately utilitarian. The prime example is law and economics, which, 
on Alschuler's stage, is represented by his colleague on the Chicago 
faculty, Judge Richard Posner. In the "more piquant" version 
(pp. 6-8), value skepticism goes all the way and sees law only as "the 
self-interested exercise of power" (p. 2). On the political right, the 
main example is public choice theory, on the left, it appears in the garb 
of critical legal studies, critical race theory, and feminist jurisprudence. 
The overall result is an appalling lack of ethical values in law shared 
by the left and right. 
To the extent it relates to Holmes, this morality play consists of 
three elements: a new and valuable interpretation of Holmes's juris­
prudential significance, an interesting but poorly documented thesis 
that both the right and left in American jurisprudence are his heirs, 
and an amazing claim that following Holmes's path has steered us to­
wards the crisis of modern American society at large. 
The most valuable aspect is the interpretation of Holmes's role in 
the development of American jurisprudence. The book depicts him as 
a destroyer not so much of formalism but of the natural law tradition. 
It correctly states that in the nineteenth century formalism was not 
nearly as prevalent as commonly assumed, and that Holmes's evolu­
tionary, policy-oriented, and adaptive view of law was not nearly as 
novel (pp. 91-101). According to Alschuler, the crucial change lay 
somewhere else: Holmes and those who joined him (including the 
"formalist" Langdell) abandoned the idea that jurisprudence must rest 
on ethical foundations, i.e., that it must be guided by substantive no­
tions of justice. Thus, Holmes's main contribution was not that he 
added something to, but that he took something away from, American 
legal thought, namely "the sense that law can further objectives be­
yond internal coherence, personal tastes, and selfish interests" (p. 10). 
In short, "Holmes was at the forefront of a revolution whose achieve­
ments were mainly negative. This revolution was not a 'revolt against 
formalism' but a revolt against objective concepts of right and wrong 
- a revolt against natural law" (p. 10). 
Alschuler's new interpretation is both important and convincing. 
To be sure, the claim that the revolution Holmes led was not a revolt 
against formalism is difficult to defend,33 just as we may doubt the ex-
33. Even Alschuler admits, though just in passing, that Holmes was "a needed corrective 
for the mechanistic legal thought of tum-of-the-century America." P. 181. 
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tent to which Holmes rejected natural law ideas.34 But we can leave 
that to one side. The insight remains that Holmes's agenda was also, 
and perhaps even primarily, a revolt against the belief in substantive 
values in jurisprudence. This sheds new light on Holmes and on the 
changes that occurred in American legal thought after the Civil War. 
It also helps us understand the relationship between Holmes and 
Langdell (and other formalists), i.e., their shared positivism that dif­
fered so markedly from the antebellum period and that became so 
dominant from 1870 onward. 
Alschuler's thesis that both the right and left in modern American 
jurisprudence, especially of the "piquant" variety, are the heirs of 
Holmes, is more difficult to assess. To begin with, one must be clear 
exactly what he says. His thesis is not that, with Holmes, we have all 
become policy-oriented pragmatists and realists; that would be banal. 
Instead, Alschuler maintains that we have succumbed to Holmes's re­
jection of ultimate truth, to his fundamental value skepticism, and to 
his belief that law is merely the result of power struggles. Alschuler 
does not claim Holmes as the only cause of this development,35 but he 
does see him as the leading figure who sent us down the path toward a 
loss of substantive values. This thesis is intriguing, and it is perhaps to 
a considerable extent correct. But it is problematic in two respects. 
First, Alschuler's claim is questionable because moral elements and 
the pursuit of substantive values are not lacking from American law at 
large. Just think of antidiscrimination policies and affirmative action, 
feminist equality claims or human rights. Or consider the prominent 
role of Ronald Dworkin in current American legal philosophy. In fact, 
regarding many issues, there may very well be too little, rather than 
too much, moral skepticism - witness the morally charged debates 
about abortion, gay rights, and the death penalty. Thus, Alschuler's 
claim that moral skepticism is rife and exaggerated in modern Ameri­
can law is true with regard to some areas, but not across the board. 
Second, even with regard to the particular strands of American juris­
prudence he has in mind, especially the economic analysis of law and 
some radical left-wing agendas, Alschuler fails to substantiate the 
connection he sees between Holmes and present-day value skepticism. 
One would expect him to demonstrate how, when, and where 
Holmes's ideas came to dominate modern American legal thought, 
perhaps through Pound or the Realists, but Alschuler does nothing of 
that sort. Except for the fact that Richard Posner is a Holmes fan, 
34. See HOFFHEIMER, supra note 6 (arguing that Holmes's thought contained significant 
natural law elements). Alschuler does not address Hoffheimer's argument but seems to have 
overlooked his book. 
35. In fact, Alschuler writes that the "revolution " would have happened even without 
Holmes. P. 185. 
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Alschuler offers no proof that the moral relativism or power-based 
views of law in modern jurisprudence are primarily due to Holmes.36 
The upshot of Alschuler's morality play is that the value skepticism 
we have embraced since Holmes has led to the disintegration of 
American society as a whole (pp. 187-90). According to the book, this 
society is in a horrible condition. It has the "vices of atomism, aliena­
tion, ambivalence, self-centeredness, and vacuity of commitment" 
(p. 187), and its members are "indolent, cynical, and bitter - envious 
of those above, reproachful of those below, and mistrustful of those 
around them" (p. 187). Its evils range from "selfish-consumerism" and 
"electronic junk" (p. 188) to crime, child-abuse, guns in school, and 
overweight teenagers (pp. 187-89). 
All this is true, but one wonders what it has to do with Holmes. 
Alschuler himself is not sure. On the one hand, he claims that "[w]e 
have walked Holmes's path and have lost our way" (p. 187), on the 
other hand he realizes that one "cannot blame teen pregnancies on 
Oliver Wendell Holmes" (p. 189). Thus, he vaguely speaks of "affini­
ties, symbols, parables, and paradigms" (p. 189). Apparently, the de­
plorable state of modern American society isn't really due to Holmes, 
although it sort of is. This part of the book does not further our under­
standing of Holmes nor, for that matter, of modern jurisprudence. It is 
not even a useful educational message. Alschuler wishes to "prompt 
some reconsideration of where Holmesian skepticism is likely to lead" 
(p. 194), but he fails to show how it leads to doubling homicide rates 
(p. 189) or passive and solitary consumption (p. 188), not to mention 
"blunt, ugly, angry and dissociative art" (p. 188). Like many doomsay­
ers37 and cultural pessimists before him,38 Alschuler apparently be­
lieves that America will go to hell in a handbasket unless we forsake 
our evil ways and restore morality in society, and he may very well be 
right. But his jeremiad is so tenuously connected with Holmes and so 
overblown that it provides a sorry finale for the book. 
IV. A LAWWITHOUTVALUES 
If the reader takes a step back from the particular agendas and 
looks at the book as a whole, he or she may note two things. On the 
36. Alschuler does hint at a connection between Holmes's bad-man theory, which turns 
law "into a system " of prices, p. 174, as well as his theory of contract, and modern economic 
analysis of law. Pp. 172-79. But even here, it remains unclear what exactly the connection is. 
If the fathers of law and economics, such as Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi, adopted 
Holmes's bleak views of life and law, Law Without Values does not tell us when, or how, or 
why. 
37. Alschuler realizes that his views are "reminiscent of doomsayers since Plato." P. 189. 
38. Perhaps the best known modern American examples are ALLAN BLOOM, THE 
CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987), and ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD 
GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996). 
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one hand, the work lacks internal coherence so that its overall accom­
plishment is difficult to assess. On the other hand, Law Without Values 
manages to illuminate an important, and disturbing, aspect of modern 
legal thought by linking it to Holmes's ideas. 
The book lacks a coherent internal structure mainly because it 
does not clarify how the various agendas relate to each other. Are they 
coequal themes, tacked together because they are, in a sense, all about 
Holmes? In that case, we really have three law review articles, mixed 
up in a rather jumbled fashion and published in one volume. Or is 
there one dominant theme - perhaps Holmes's pernicious influence 
on modern legal thought - with the other two assisting in its devel­
opment? If so, it remains unclear what, if anything, many of the bits 
and pieces contribute to that larger effort. Either Alschuler never 
pondered these questions or he simply did not care much about the 
answers. Moreover, the flow of the argument is seriously interrupted 
by various lengthy discourses that do not really advance any of the 
book's principal agendas. These digressions go off on all sorts of tan­
gents, from general jurisprudential issues to particular critiques of law 
and economics doctrines.39 In and of themselves, many of these mini­
essays are extremely perceptive and highly valuable, and it is under­
standable that Alschuler could not resist the temptation to include 
them. But using a book on Holmes as a launching platform for lengthy 
and abstract discussions of the meaning of law or for voicing deep 
frustration with modern social decline is distracting and confusing.40 
Since Law Without Values fails to integrate its many parts into a co­
herent whole, the book remains a loosely organized collection of pro­
vocative theses and interesting ideas about Holmes in particular and 
American jurisprudence in general. Ironically, Alschuler's work on 
Holmes is much like Holmes's work itself - less original than it 
seems, rhapsodic, and plagued by digressions but also intriguing, pene-
-trating, and occasionally brilliant. 
39. The clearest illustration of this problem is the lengthy chapter 7 on The Path of the 
Law. Pp. 132-80. More than half of it is not about Holmes or his essay at all. Alschuler dis­
cusses the relationship between law and morality in the abstract (including the Hart-Fuller 
debate), pp. 150-58, pursues such general questions as "Why Define Law?" pp. 158-61, and 
"What is Law?" pp. 161-72, and criticizes law and economics, especially the theory of effi­
cient breach. Pp. 177-79. Note that these are not minor digressions but major detours which 
take up dozens and dozens of pages. At times, Alschuler shows an awareness of the problem 
when he admits that the discussion "will carry this chapter some distance from Path of the 
Law." P. 161. Still, when he admonishes the reader that "it's about Holmes, remember," 
p. 291 n.159, one is tempted to respond: "No, it isn't." 
40. The readability of the book is also impaired by Alschuler's eschewal of footnotes in 
favor of endnotes, the consultation of which is notoriously inconvenient. In the case of Law 
Without Values, the problem is aggravated by the sheer volume of the notes, which cover 
over a hundred pages, pp. 195-306 - more than half as much space as the text. To be sure, 
endnotes are not the author's fault, but the terrible habit of most university presses. I suggest 
that we reintroduce tarring and feathering as a punishment especially reserved for those re­
sponsible for this utter nonsense. 
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Despite this lack of integration, and despite its occasional hyper­
bole, Law Without Values sheds an interesting, though somewhat dif­
fuse, light on modem American jurisprudence: it links the modem 
moral skepticism and utilitarian pragmatism to the dark side of 
Holmes and thereby elucidates the disturbing implications of these 
phenomena. In this context, it does not really matter whether Holmes 
is responsible for the current prominence of skepticism and conse­
quentialism in American law, or whether these features are in tum re­
sponsible for our real or perceived social malaise. Be that as it may, 
Alschuler is right that there is an important, and undeniable, affinity 
between important elements in modem American legal thought on the 
one hand, and Holmes's jurisprudence on the other: sharing a com­
mitment to moral skepticism and legal instrumentalism, they both 
consider law primarily a result of political struggles and an instrument 
of social policy rather than an expression of moral values or a pursuit 
of natural justice.41 The harsh and nihilistic Holmes that Alschuler por­
trays presents skepticism and consequentialism in extreme form so 
that Holmes can help us, as a caricature so to speak, to recognize the 
dangers implicit in these attitudes. His jurisprudence shows us how 
nicely much of modem mainstream American legal thought jives with 
the attitude that might makes right and that the law does not care if 
the devil takes the hindmost. In other words, by looking at Holmes, we 
can recognize how an infatuation with moral skepticism and with law 
as a means of social engineering marginalizes ethical concerns and 
comes perilously close to moral indifference, deference to the victors, 
and contempt for the losers. 
Thus the ultimate importance of the book lies neither in its elabo­
rate but largely familiar critique of Holmes, nor in its questionable at­
tempt at a consistent interpretation of the man and his work, nor in its 
unsubstantiated claim that Holmes is to blame for the status quo of 
our jurisprudence and society. Instead, its main importance lies in a 
simple but valuable reminder: if American legal culture continues to 
revere a Nietzschean nihilist, a power-addicted war enthusiast, and an 
emotional cripple without sympathy for the underdog, it is flirting with 
moral bankruptcy. 
41. Another affinity between Holmes and much, though by no means all, modern legal 
scholarship is stylistic. Holmes understood that in order to style yourself as a guru, you have 
to sell your ideas appropriately. You have to exaggerate in order to get attention, to simplify 
in order to make your ideas attractive to the shallow thinker (as well as easy to remember), 
but also to remain sufficiently obscure and contradictory in order to provide a long-term 
challenge for the more profound reader. All of these techniques are frequently employed 
(consciously or not) by many modern scholars as well, often with amazing success. Since this 
style is so obviously at odds with careful scholarship, which calls for moderation, differentia­
tion, and clarity, one wonders whether it has become so widely accepted because Holmes 
made it respectable. This might be a topic for a study in its own right. 
